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A great number of classical Sanskrit texts, most of them philosophical, refer to the 
Cārvākas or Lokāyatas (also Laukāyatikas, Lokāyatikas, Bārhaspatyas)2 who must have 
constituted a school of thought which has left us almost no literary documents.
3
 They once 
possessed a Sūtra text and several commentaries thereon, for fragments have been 
preserved in the works of those who criticise them.
4
 In modern secondary literature the 
Cārvākas are usually referred to as “materialists”, which is somewhat unfortunate. It is true 
that the Sūtra text (sometime called Bārhaspatya Sūtra) accepts as only principles (tattva) 
the four elements earth, water, fire and air;
5
 yet the term “materialism” and its cognates 
evoke in the modern world associations which are not necessarily appropriate for this 
ancient school of thought. For Marxist historians in particular, materialism is the opposite 
of idealism; the former is knowledge, the latter faith.
6
 The latter kind of philosophers 
“worked in defence of obscurantism, irrationalism and scripture-mongering caste hatred”; 
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2
 Franco & Preisendanz (1998: 179) note: “These terms seem to apply only to the followers, not to 
the school itself.” Pārthasārathi's explanation of Kumārila's expression lokāyatīkṛtā (see below) 
suggests that lokāyata can be used as an adjective. Kṛṣṇa Miśra's Prabodhacandrodaya has the 
line sarvathā lokāyatam eva śāstram yatra pratyakṣam eva pramāṇam (p. 76; Pédraglio, 1974: 
154); here lokāyata appears to be a noun that applies to the school, even though an adjectival 
interpretation is not impossible. 
3
 Jayarāśi's Tattvopaplavasiṃha “is the only text of the Lokāyata or Cārvāka school which has come 
down to us”, yet “[i]t is clear that there are important philosophical differences between Jayarāśi's 
views and what usually goes under the name of Lokāyata philosophy”; Franco, 1987: 3-4. 
4
 For a very useful collection of fragments, see Bhattacharya, 2002. 
5
 pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni; Bhattacharya, 2002: 603. 
6
 Cf. Ruben, 1979 (Wissen gegen Glauben) 
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the former were “struggling in their own way against the same ideological forces, though 
under limitations historically inevitable for them”.7 Idealism promotes faith, and faith is an 
instrument needed to maintain a society based on class antagonism and class exploitation.
8
 
Materialism does the opposite, and there is therefore a tendency among some of these 
historians to associate this philosophy with the less privileged layers of society.  
Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya's study Lokāyata (1959), for example, states in its 
introduction (p. xvii): 
 
What then was the original Lokayata? ... Etymologically it means “that which is 
prevalent among the people” ... But the earliest of the available clues are hopelessly 
fragmentary and are too often embedded in mythological imagination. Nevertheless, 
a careful examination of some of these may give us a dim view of a primordial 
complex of a this-worldly outlook related to a body of ritual practices and the whole 
theme being somehow or other “prevalent” among the masses. 
 
This “humble beginning”, as he calls it, occupies much of Chattopadhyaya's book. 
One fears that the modern associations of the term materialism have pushed at least some 
research of the Cārvākas into a direction that may not be appropriate to it.9 
 There is another reason to be careful with the expression “materialism”. It is far 
from certain that the emphasis of the Cārvāka philosophy was on the central role of the 
material elements. Among its other positions that are often cited in the texts is the rejection 
of what is called “another world”, which in practice primarily means the rejection of rebirth 
and karmic retribution. The most often cited sūtra in this connection is: paralokino 'bhāvāt 
paralokābhāvaḥ “There is no other-world because of the absence of any other-worldly 
being (i.e., the transmigrating self).”10 It shows that the rejection of the self was an element 
in the rejection of “another world”. And the rejection of the self was based on the view that 
the normal characteristics of the self, most notably consciousness, derive directly from the 
elements, so that there is no need for a self.
11
 Seen in this way we have to consider the 
possibility that the materialist construction served the ultimate aim of rejecting rebirth and 
karmic retribution, more than a love of materialism per se. This would put the Cārvākas in 
an altogether different perspective: their aim would in that case primarily be negative, and 
the point of view they were concerned to reject would not be idealism or some such 
position, but the belief in “another world”. 
                         
7
 Chattopadhyaya, 1976: vii-viii. 
8
 Chattopadhyaya, 1976: 212. 
9
 According to the Bibliography of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, there even exists a 
recent book called Charvaka Darshan: Ancient Indian Dalit Philosophy (Rao, 1997) 
10
 Bhattacharya, 2002: 605, 612. 
11
 tebhyaś caitanyam; Bhattacharya, 2002: 604. 
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 This change of emphasis finds support elsewhere. The Buddhists were concerned 
with the intellectual threat coming from the Cārvākas, not of course because they denied 
the soul, but because they denied “another world”. They reacted by writing against this 
position, sometimes in independent treatises called Paralokasiddhi “Proof of another world 
/ rebirth”, or in sections of larger treatises.12 Various Brahmanical authors, moreover, admit 
that their concern to prove the eternality of the soul has as ultimate aim to show that there is 
life after death.
13
 
 There is also an intriguing verse at the beginning of Kumārila's Ślokavārttika which 
reads:
14
 
 
For the most part Mīmāṃsā has, in this world, been turned into Lokāyata. This 
effort of mine is made to take it to the path of the āstikas. 
 
Ganga Nath Jha (1900: 2) translates this verse differently, saying that Mīmāṃsā “has been 
made Atheis[t]ic”; Kumārila's effort, according to him, is “to turn it to the theistic path”.15 
This cannot however be correct. The Lokāyatas are here, too, those who deny “another 
world”, and the āstikas are those who accept it.16 This is confirmed by Pārthasārathi's 
comments on this verse:
17
 
 
Mīmāṃsā, though not being Lokāyata, has been turned into Lokāyata by 
Bhartṛmitra and others by accepting the incorrect position according to which there 
is no fruit, desired or not desired, of obligatory and forbidden [deeds] etc.  
 
Theism and atheism are clearly not envisaged here 
                         
12
 See Steinkellner, 1984; 1985; 1986; 1988; Franco, 1997. 
13
 Preisendanz (1994: II: 299 n. 79) mentions various authors (Vācaspati Miśra II, Keśava Miśra, 
Vardhamāna the author of the Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa, Bhāsarvajña, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa) for whom 
“[d]ie Tätigkeit im Hinblick auf weitere Existenz ... der letztendliche Zweck der ausserordentlichen 
Bemühungen [ist], die Ewigkeit der Seele zu beweisen”. Cp. Tucci, 1923-29: 55. 
14
 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Ślokavārttika, Pratijñā v. 10: prāyeṇaiva hi mīmāṃsā loke lokāyatīkṛtā / tām 
āstikapathe kartum ayaṃ yatnaḥ kṛto mayā // 
15
 Similarly Tucci, 1923-29: 96 n. 3. 
16
 This usage is quite common, especially among the Jainas; Haribhadra's Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya 
v. 77, for example, refers collectively to the doctrines of Buddhists, Jainas, Sāṃkhyas, Jainas, 
Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas as āstikavāda “doctrines of the āstikas”. He then moves on to the 
Lokāyatas, who are nāstikas. Note further that the Kāśikā on P. 4.4.60 (astināstidiṣṭaṃ matiḥ), 
which accounts for the words āstika and nāstika in the senses “he who thinks ‘there is’” and “he who 
thinks ‘there is not’” respectively, adds (Kāś I p. 448): na ca matisattāmātre pratyaya iṣyate, kiṃ 
tarhi, paraloko 'sti iti yasya matiḥ sa āstikaḥ / tadviparīto nāstikaḥ /. 
17
 Pārthasārathi, Nyāyaratnākara p. 5: mīmāṃsā hi bhartṛmitrādibhir alokāyataiva satī lokāyatīkṛtā 
nityaniṣiddhayor iṣṭāniṣṭaṃ phalaṃ nāstītyādibahvapasiddhāntaparigraheṇeti. Note that lokāyata is 
here used as an adjective. 
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 Who, then, were these Cārvākas? Our texts rarely express themselves on this 
question, and concentrate all the more on the arguments for and against their positions. 
However, there are some exceptions, to which we now turn. One passage to be considered 
occurs in Śīlāṅka's Sūtrakṛtāṅgavṛtti, a commentary written towards the end of the ninth 
century
18
 on the Jaina canonical text Sūyagaḍa (Sūyagaḍaṃga; Skt. Sūtrakṛtāṅga). Śīlāṅka 
on Sūy 1.1.1.6 comments the words ege samaṇamāhaṇā (“Certain Śramaṇas and 
Brahmins”) as follows (p. 9):19 
 
Certain Śramaṇas, viz. Buddhists etc., and Brahmins who are followers of the 
opinions of the Bārhaspatya.  
 
The Bārhaspatya is the Bārhaspatya Sūtra, the classical text of the Cārvākas. Śīlāṅka 
indicates here that there are all kinds of Brahmins, some of whom are Cārvākas. The 
implicit suggestion is that the Cārvākas are all, or most of them, Brahmins. 
 If this suggestion looks at first surprising, a number of other factors support it. 
Jayarāśi, the author of the only surviving work (Tattvopaplavasiṃha) of the Lokāyata or 
Cārvāka school that has come down to us, calls himself in the concluding verses 
bhaṭṭaśrījayarāśidevaguru “guru Bhaṭṭa Śrī Jayarāśi Deva”.20 Another teacher of the school 
is known as Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa. The honorific Bhaṭṭa indicates that these two were 
Brahmins,
21
 perhaps Brahmin householders.
22
 To this can be added that two other Cārvāka 
authors, Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta, and perhaps also Udbhaṭa, appear to have written 
Nyāya works as well.23 Udbhaṭa, moreover, was a grammarian in the Pāṇinian tradition 
besides being a Cārvāka, and perhaps also an Ālaṅkārika.24 All these teachers had therefore 
strong links to Brahmanical traditions. 
 Śīlāṅka's commentary has a further surprise in store. Under the immediately 
following verses of the Sūyagaḍa it discusses at length the positions of the Cārvākas. Most 
surprising is that under verse 11 it cites, in support of their position, a Vedic passage, 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.4.12, which it calls “their scriptural authority” (tadāgama):25 
                         
18
 Winternitz, GIL II p. 318. 
19
 Śīlāṅka, Sūtrakṛtāṅgavṛtti, p. 9 (on Sūy 1.1.1.6: ege samaṇamāhaṇā): eke śramaṇāḥ śākyādayo 
bārhaspatyamatānusāriṇaś ca brāhmaṇāḥ. 
20
 Jayarāśi, Tattvopaplavasiṃha p. 125; Franco, 1987: 7. 
21
 So Solomon, 1978: 992. 
22
 So Slaje, 2007. 
23
 Franco, 1997: 142, with references to Steinkellner, 1961, and Potter, 1977: 281, 338-340; further 
Solomon, 1978: 990 f. 
24
 Solomon, 1978: 992; Bronkhorst, 2008. 
25
 Śīlāṅka, Sūtrakṛtāṅgavṛtti, p. 14 (on Sūy 1.1.1.11): tathā hi tadāgamaḥ: vijñānaghana evaitebhyo 
bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati na pretya saṃjñāstīti. 
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“For this is their scriptural authority: ‘A single mass of perception, having arisen out of 
these elements, disappears after them: there is no awareness after death’”. 
 Śīlāṅka was not the only, nor indeed the first one, to connect the Cārvākas with this 
particular Vedic passage.
26
 The Āvaśyakaniryukti v. 600 speaks, in connection with the 
denial of the soul (jīva), of Vedic words that have been misunderstood (veyapayāṇa ya 
atthaṃ na yāṇasī, Skt. vedapadānāṃ cārthaṃ na jānāsi). Its commentator Haribhadra 
(eighth century) cites in this connection (p. 161-62) the same Upaniṣadic passage and 
discusses it. Before him, in the sixth or seventh century, Jinabhadra does so in his 
Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya. He refers to this passage in his verse 2043, and cites it in full in his 
own commentary (p. 354). The commentator Koṭyārya, commenting one or two centuries 
later
27
 on Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya verses 2404-06, cites this passage to show that the Veda 
sometimes agrees that “the other world” does not exist.28 Kumārila (seventh century) 
mentions in his Ślokavārttika someone “who concludes on the basis of the Veda that there 
is no self”.29 His commentator Pārthasārathi Miśra (eleventh century) cites here the same 
Upaniṣadic passage.30 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, who like Śīlāṅka wrote towards the end of the ninth 
century, cites the passage in the context of a Lokāyatika opponent who thinks that one 
should stop wasting one's time talking about “another world”.31 Elsewhere in the same 
work Jayanta expresses his concern that this Upaniṣadic passage might support the 
Lokāyata position.32 At the end of the seventh Āhnika he returns once again to this 
Upaniṣadic passage, connecting it with the pūrvapakṣa, and then refers to other passages 
from the same Upaniṣad according to which the self does not perish, and comments that 
that is the siddhānta.33 Malayagiri, in his Āvaśyakaniryuktivivaraṇa of the twelfth century, 
                         
26
 See Uno, 1999. 
27
 Balbir, 1993: 78 f. 
28
 Koṭyārya, p. 439: vedo 'pi “vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny evānu 
vinaśyati” iti paralokanāstitvam anuvadati. 
29
 Kumārila, Ślokavārttika, Ātmavāda v. 140ab: vedād evātmanāstitvaṃ yo nāma pratipadyate [...] I 
resolve ātmanāstitvam as ātma-nāstitvam, “non-existence of the self”. Theoretically one might read 
ātmanā astitvam (or ātmana[ḥ] astitvam, with incorrect sandhi!?); this is difficult to construe, but 
may lie behind Jha's translation (p. 407): “One who would seek to know the Soul by the help of the 
Veda alone”. 
30
 Pārthasārathi, Nyāyaratnākara p. 513: yo vedavādī śiṣyaḥ, yo vā “vijñānaghana evaitebhyo 
bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati [na] pretya saṃjñāsti”iti bhūtacaitanyābhidhānād 
vedavirodham ātmano manyate ... The edition reads taṃ pretya, which must be a mistake. 
31
 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Nyāyamañjarī, ed. Varadacharya, vol. II p. 268: ayam api cāgamo 'sty eva 
“vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati na pretya saṃjñāsti” iti / 
tad ātmano nityasya paralokino 'bhāvāt kṛtam etābhiḥ apārthakapariśramakariṇībhiḥ 
paralokakathābhiḥ /. 
32
 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Nyāyamañjarī, ed. Varadacharya, vol. I p. 647: nanu ca lokāyatādyāgame 'py 
evaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ prāpnoti “vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati 
na pretya saṃjñāsti” iti vedamūladarśanāt. 
33
 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Nyāyamañjarī, ed. Varadacharya, vol. II p. 358: yad 
vijñānaghanādivedavacanaṃ tat pūrvapakṣe sthitaṃ, paurvāparyavimarśaśūnyahṛdayaiḥ so 'rtho 
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and the author of the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha34 in the fourteenth, still connect the Cārvākas 
with this passage.
35
 
 Recall at this point that according to Kumārila and Pārthasārathi the Mīmāṃsakas 
Bhartṛmitra and others had turned Mīmāṃsā into Lokāyata by accepting that there is no 
other world. This was presumably not very difficult. Śabara's Bhāṣya discusses the meaning 
of “heaven” (svarga) under sūtras 6.1.1-2 and comes to the conclusion that heaven is 
“happiness” (prīti), not “a thing characterised by happiness” (prītiviśiṣṭa dravya). The 
popular notion according to which heaven is a very agreeable place where one goes after 
death is discarded. Put differently, in Śabara's Mīmāṃsā the belief in “another world” is not 
at all obvious. Śabara's Mīmāṃsā ignores everything that concerns rebirth and liberation; 
even its conception of heaven is compatible with a denial of life after death. Bhartṛmitra's 
explicit denial was therefore hardly a very revolutionary move within Mīmāṃsa. We 
should not of course conclude from this that Cārvāka thought was identical with the 
Mīmāṃsā of Śabara, Bhartṛmitra or others, but nor should we lose sight of the fact that the 
two have points in common. 
 
At this point some serious questions have to be addressed. Aren't the Cārvākas the greatest 
critics of the Vedic tradition? Aren't they characterised by “fierce opposition to the 
religious Weltanschauung which had sacrifices at its center”?36 Aren't there verses 
attributed to them that ridicule the ritual and everything that is connected with the Veda? At 
the same time, we have seen that the Cārvākas presumably justified their positions with the 
help of at least one Vedic quotation. It is not necessary to recall that the Buddhists and 
Jainas would never dream of justifying their positions with the help of Vedic quotations; 
even Brahmanical philosophers other than Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins do not often do so. 
Why then do the Cārvākas, of all people, do so? And what does the partial similarity of 
Cārvāka thought and some forms of Mīmāṃsā signify? 
                                                                           
gṛhītas tathā / maitreyyā paricoditas tu bhagavān yad yājñavalkyo 'bravīt, ātmā naiva vinaśyatīti tad 
idaṃ siddhāntasāraṃ vacaḥ //. The other passages, as Cakradhara points out, are avināśī vā are 
ayam ātmā (BĀrUp(K) 4.5.14), aśīryo na hi śīryate (BĀrUp(K) 4.5.15), etc. 
34
 Sāyaṇamādhava, Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha p. 3 l. 25-27. Jayatilleke (1963: 69-70), too, concludes 
from this that “Materialist philosophy emerged within the Brāhmaṇical fold”. 
35
 This is not the only Vedic passage that is connected with the Cārvākas. Sadānanda's 
Vedāntasāra (pp. 7-8) presents four different Cārvākas who invoke three passages from the 
Taittirīya Upaniṣad and one from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad to justify their respective positions. The 
fact that subsequently a Buddhist is introduced who justifies his position with another passage from 
the Taittirīya Upaniṣad shows that no historical conclusions should be drawn from this. Cf. 
Hillebrandt, 1916: 19 [347]; Tucci, 1923-29: 118-19. 
36
 Franco, 1987: 8. 
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 It is in this context important to recall Ramkrishna Bhattacharya's following 
judicious remarks (2002: 599): 
 
A look at the Cārvāka fragments collected to date reveals the fact that most of them 
are found in works written between the eighth and twelfth centuries CE. Although 
Cārvāka studies really began after the publication of the editio princeps of [the 
Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha], it should be noted that this digest rarely quotes any 
Cārvāka aphorism that can be taken as genuine. It only purports to give, both in 
prose and verse, the essence of the Cārvāka philosophy, not in the words of any 
Cārvāka author, but as the learned fourteenth-century Vedāntin understood it. Nor 
does he mention the name of a single Cārvāka work, text or commentary (which he 
does profusely while dealing with other philosophical systems in the same work). 
So it may be admitted that all Cārvāka works had disappeared from India even 
before Sāyaṇa-mādhava's time.37 
 
This makes sense where the collection of fragments is concerned, but also in the 
reconstruction of the philosophy and, last but no least, in finding out what others thought of 
the Cārvākas. Authors after, say, the twelfth century had no direct knowledge of the 
Cārvākas and their ideas any more. They felt free to attribute to them all manner of 
positions which they disapproved of. An inspection of the Cārvāka fragments collected by 
Bhattacharya shows that criticism of the Veda and its associated practices are virtually 
confined to ślokas, most of which are only cited in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, a text which 
is no longer acquainted with the school; other are cited in other late works, or they are 
simply not connected with the Cārvākas, so that we have no grounds for assuming that 
Cārvākas in particular are meant.38 None of the thirty extracts from the commentaries in his 
collection says anything against Vedic texts and practices. Of the eighteen sūtras collected 
two, according to Bhattacharya, deal with vedaprāmāṇyaniṣedhavāda, the rejection of 
Vedic authority. However, both these sūtras (unlike most others) are ambiguous and do not 
                         
37
 The appropriateness of the title of a recent work (Les matérialistes dans l’Inde ancienne; 
Ballanfat, 1997), which doubts the authenticity of the early Cārvāka quotations, and bases itself 
almost exclusively on the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, is therefore questionable. 
38
 This may in particular be true of Śl. 2 in Bhattacharya's collection, which reads: agnihotraṃ trayo 
vedās tridaṇḍaṃ bhasmaguṇṭhanam / buddhipauruṣahīnānāṃ jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ //. He translates: 
“Bṛhaspati says — The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's 
self with ashes, — (all these) are the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness.” 
This verse is cited in Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga (ed. Shah p. 75), without any 
indication as to its origin. The name Bṛhaspati is no guarantee that Cārvākas are here meant: recall 
that the followers of Bṛhaspati are frequently referred to in the Arthaśāstra and elsewhere as 
thinkers who have certain views about politics and morality. The Arthaśāstra attributes to them the 
view that “Vedic lore is only a cloak for one conversant with the ways of the world”; see below. 
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need to concern the Veda at all.
39
 What is more, they are only cited in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's 
Nyāyamañjarī, in a context which gives no hint as to their correct interpretation.40 
 It seems likely that the anti-Vedic element came to be attributed to the Cārvākas 
later on, probably at a time when they were no longer around to show how inappropriate 
this was.  
This gives rise to the following interesting question. Do more recent sources also 
attribute this philosophy to non-Brahmins, to lower strata of society? Unfortunately the 
evidence concerning the social position of the Cārvākas is scarce, both for the earlier and 
for the more recent period. But there is at least one passage that fully confirms this 
expectation. Guṇaratna Sūri, the author of a commentary on Haribhadra's 
Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya called Tarkarahasyadīpikā, lived in the early fifteenth century. 
While introducing Haribhadra's chapter on the Lokāyatas he states:41  
 
First the nature of the nāstikas will be explained. The nāstikas are skull-bearing 
Yogins covered with ashes, and some [others], from Brahmins to Śūdras.42 They do 
not accept the soul, virtue and vice, etc. 
 
Guṇaratna does not dare to say, it seems, that the Cārvākas could not possibly be Brahmins. 
Perhaps the tradition connecting the two was still too strong in his days. But he includes 
lower strata of society, down to the lowest (antyaja), and we may read between the lines 
that the Brahmins who accepted this philosophy were no better than Śūdras. We may 
conclude that in Guṇaratna's time Cārvākas had become strawmen to whom one could 
attribute all that was reproachable and despicable. 
 It is hard to say with precision when this change of attitude towards the Cārvākas 
had taken place. It was already there in the second half of the eleventh century, at the time 
                         
39
 They are dharmo na kāryaḥ and tad upadeśeṣu na pratyetavyam (or tadupadeśeṣu na 
pratyetavyam); Bhattacharya's translations (“Religious act is not to be performed” and “Its 
(religion's) instructions are not to be relied upon”) preserve the ambiguity. 
40
 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Nyāyamañjarī, ed. Varadacharya, vol. I p. 647-48: nanu ca “yāvajjīvaṃ sukhaṃ 
jīvet” iti tatropadiśyate / evaṃ “na svabhāvasiddhatvena, atropadeśavaiphalyāt”, “dharmo na 
kāryaḥ”, “tadupadeśeṣu na pratyetavyam” ity evaṃ vā yad upadiśyate tat prativihitam eva 
pūrvapakṣavacanamūlatvāt lokāyatadarśanasya / tathā ca tatra uttarabrāhmaṇaṃ bhavati “na vā 
are ahaṃ mohaṃ bravīmi avināśī vā are 'yam ātmā mātrāsaṃsargas tv asya bhavati ” (BĀrUp(M) 
4.5.14) iti / 
41
 Guṇaratna Sūri, Tarkarahasyadīpikā, p. 450: prathamaṃ nāstikasvarūpam ucyate / kāpālikā 
bhasmoddhūlanaparā yogino brāhmaṇādyantyajāntāś ca kecana nāstikā bhavanti / te ca 
jīvapuṇyapāpādikaṃ na manyante / 
42
 Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya (1990: 266) translate: “The Nāstikas are a kind of people, 
including Brahmins and ending with the low-born, who carry human skulls, smear their bodies with 
ashes and practise yoga”. This translation does no justice to the word ca “and”. 
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of Kṛṣṇa Miśra, the author of the allegorical drama called Prabodhacandrodaya.43 The 
Cārvāka in this drama cites several of the anti-Vedic ślokas44 which also the 
Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha associates with him. (It is however noteworthy that the Cārvāka in 
this play is a court philosopher and friend of the king, whereas the other heterodox 
doctrines appear in the form of ridiculous monks: a Jaina monk, a Buddhist monk, and a 
Kāpālika.45) Already before Kṛṣṇa Miśra, Vācaspati Miśra46 did not hesitate to call the 
Cārvākas inferior to animals (because more stupid than these), but this may not tell us much 
about their position in society according to this author. 
 
We have come to think that the Lokāyata position was primarily the denial of “another 
world”, without anti-Vedic overtones. We have even seen that Mīmāṃsā in one of its forms 
had been very close to this school of thought. All this has interesting implications. Most 
schools of Indian philosophy have the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution as a shared 
presupposition. This belief is common to practically all surviving schools, however much 
they may differ in other respects. This is noteworthy, for the oldest texts of Brahmanism, 
which together constitute the Veda, do not know this belief until their most recent parts. 
Some Brahmins adopted this belief in the late-Vedic period, with the result that it started 
finding expression in late-Vedic texts from the earliest Upaniṣads onward, but clearly not 
all Brahmins were convinced. Brahmanical orthodoxy as incorporated in the the Mīmāṃsā 
school of hermeneutics had not yet accepted this belief around the middle of the first 
millennium of the Common Era and later. We can be sure that many other Brahmins, too, 
took centuries to adopt this way of looking at the world. It also seems likely that this 
process, which for some may have taken a thousand years or longer, was sometimes 
marked by discussions between those who did and those who did not accept this doctrine. 
The Mīmāṃsā school of hermeneutics does not reject the doctrine in its classical text, the 
Śābara Bhāṣya; it ignores it. It does not therefore participate in the debate which we 
assume may have taken place at its time. All the other philosophical schools of which texts 
survive accept this doctrine as if there were no problem. It looks as if only those Brahmins 
who accepted this doctrine participated in the philosophical debate, the single exception 
                         
43
 Pédraglio, 1974: 3 sq. 
44
 P. 77 sq.; Pédraglio, 1974: 156 sq. 
45
 Pédraglio, 1974: 20. Note that Guṇaratna's description of certain Lokāyatas as skull-bearing 
(kāpālika) contradicts Kṛṣṇa Miśra's distinction between the Cārvāka and the Kāpālika. 
46
 Vācaspati Miśra, Bhāmatī, p. 766 (on 3.3.54): nāstikas tu paśor api paśur iṣṭāniṣṭasādhanam 
avidvān. Cp. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Nyāyamañjarī, ed. Varadacharya, vol. I p. 317: tatrānumānasvarūpaṃ 
cāśakyanihnavam eva, sarvalokaprasiddhatvāt/ abalābālagopālahālikapramukhā api / budhyante 
niyatād arthāt arthāntaram asaṃśayam //. Cf. Bhattacharya, 1999a: 490. 
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being the Mīmāṃsakas, who kept silent. What happened to all those other followers of the 
Vedic tradition who were in no hurry to open up to those completely non-Vedic ideas? 
Where they excluded from the discussion? 
 It is here, I suggest, that the Cārvākas and like-minded people fit in. This suggestion 
implies, of course, that the Cārvākas were primarily Brahmins rather than representatives of 
the “lower classes”. These Brahmins resisted the encroachment of the new ideology of 
rebirth and karmic retribution with arguments of a materialistic nature. Rejecting the “other 
world” in the form of rebirth and karmic retribution, they had to abandon the belief in a 
Vedic heaven as well, because the same arguments cut both ways; however, this was no 
great sacrifice, for the “other-worldly” dimension of the heaven which is presumably 
brought about by the Vedic sacrifice was not strong. Since more and more Brahmin 
thinkers joined the other side in this debate (the side of rebirth and karmic retribution), the 
Cārvākas found themselves more and more isolated and in the end abandoned by all, 
including other Brahmins. 
 
A review of earlier passages which criticise rebirth and karmic retribution does not add 
much to our conclusions so far. Criticism against this position is found in the Buddhist 
canon, even though not in connection with the expressions “Cārvāka” and “Lokāyata”; the 
latter of these two terms appears to be used in a different sens here.
47
 But we find an 
emphatic confirmation of the truth of this doctrine in the first two of three “knowledges” 
which play a role in the enlightenment of the Buddha.
48
 Denial of this doctrine is put in the 
mouth of a certain Ajita Keśakambalin in the Pāli canon, and is associated with other names 
in other versions of the canon.
49
 Critics of the doctrine figure in one of the oldest texts of 
the (Śvetāśvara) Jaina canon.50 Then there is the story of king Pāyāsi or Paesi, preserved by 
the Buddhists and the Jainas respectively;
51
 this king does not believe in existence after 
death.
52
 A number of more recent texts, too, are acquainted with deniers of rebirth and 
karmic retribution, without mentioning the Lokāyata Sūtra in this context. Among these 
may be mentioned the Carakasaṃhitā,53 certain passages in the Mahābhārata and in the 
                         
47
 Rhys Davids, 1889; Franke, 1913: 19 n. 3; Bhattacharya, 1998; 2000; Franco & Preisendanz, 
1998: 178-179. 
48
 Bareau, 1963: 75-91; Demiéville, 1927; Schopen, 1983. 
49
 See MacQueen, 1984: 295 ff.; 1988: 152-153; Meisig, 1987: 124 ff. 
50
 Sūy 1.1.1.6-8; 11-12 (ed. tr. Bollée, 1977: 14, 15, 60, 64); 2.1.15 (tr. Jacobi, 1895: 339-40) 
51
 See Leumann, 1885; Bollée, 2002 
52
 Bronkhorst, 2003 
53
 Carakasaṃhitā, Sūtrasthāna 11.6-33; cf. Meindersma, 1990; Filliozat, 1993; Preisendanz, 1994: 
II: 307 ff. 
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Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa (1.108.12-20);54 this last case is particularly interesting, because 
the heretical position is here attributed to a lokāyatika king called Vena. In Āryaśūra's 
Jātakamālā ch. 29 it is king Aṅgadinna of Videha who believes that there is no “other 
world”. In a passage from the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra the king of the Nāgas presents himself to 
the Buddha in the form of a Brahmin and states that there is no other world.
55
 The Nyāya 
Sūtra provides arguments in support of former existences in sūtras 3.1.18-26.56  
 These passages (to which others could be added) tell us very little about the social 
background of the critics of rebirth and karmic retribution: some say nothing whatsoever 
about their social identity, others attribute this critical attitude to a king, one to a king of the 
Nāgas who had adopted the appearance of a Brahmin. The repeated appearance of kings in 
these passages yet reminds us of the fact that kings played an important role in the cultural 
life of India, especially during the millennium or so from 500 BCE to 500 CE. Kings 
during this period had courts and capitals, and these courts and capitals attracted Brahmins, 
i.e., certain Brahmins. Urbanisation started (again, after the earlier Indus civilisation) 
around 500 BCE, flourished from 200 BCE onward, and continued until it started to decline 
under and after the Guptas from the middle of the first millennium onward.
57
  
 The attitude of traditional Brahmins with regard to cities was negative, as is well-
known from literature. The Vedic Brahmins did not like cities, and preferred to live in the 
countryside, where they could preserve their ritual purity. Various Dharma Sūtras and other 
texts confirm this. The Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra, for example, states: “‘A man who 
keeps himself well under control will attain final bliss even if he lives in a city with his 
body covered with the city dust and his eyes and face coated with it’ — now that is 
something impossible.”58. The Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra, similarly, enjoins: “He should 
also avoid visiting cities.”59 Several Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads, which may belong to a slighly 
later period, contain the following advice: “He shall avoid ... capital cities as he would the 
Kumbhīpāka hell.”60 These Upaniṣads know various terms for towns of various sizes, such 
                         
54
 Bhattacharya, 1999; Hopkins, 1901: 86 ff. 
55
 Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, ed. Vaidya p. 73 l. 1-3, ed. Nanjio p. 179: atha khalu kṣṛṇapakṣiko nāgarājo 
brāhmaṇarūpeṇāgatya bhagavantam etad avocat: tena hi gautama paraloka eva na saṃvidyate. 
56
 See the relevant portions of Preisendanz, 1994 (where the sūtras are numbered 17-25). 
57
 Cp. Thapar, 2002: 245 f., 456 f. 
58
 Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra 2.6.33: purareṇukuṇṭhitaśarīras tatparipūrṇanetravadanaś ca / 
nagare vasan suniyatātmā siddhim avāpsyatīti na tad asti //; text and translation, Olivelle, 2000: 
264-265. 
59
 Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra 1.32.21: nagarapraveśanāni ca varjayet //; text and translation, 
Olivelle, 2000: 72-73. 
60
 Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad ch. 7, ed. Dikshitar p. 116, ed. Schrader p. 199-200; Bṛhat-
saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad ed. Schrader p. 268: tyajet ... rājadhānīṃ kumbhīpākam iva; tr. Olivelle, 1992: 
214, 253-254. 
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as pattana, pura and nagara,
61
 which shows that the cities were there, but the Brahmins 
addressed in these texts did not like them. These rural Brahmins, we may assume, 
concentrated on their traditional rites, and ignored, or tried to ignore, the new ideas that 
were gaining ground. 
 But there were also Brahmins in the cities, where they aspired to positions such as 
that of purohita or councillor to the king, or engaged in other activities. These were the 
Brahmins who wrote, and read, the Arthaśāstra, the Kāmasūtra, the courtly literature which 
has been preserved, and no doubt much else. Information about these urban Brahmins can 
be obtained from the Arthaśāstra. Kangle (1965: 144 f.) sums it up in the following words: 
 
Special privileges are intended for [the Brahmin], particularly for a Śrotriya, that is, 
a Brahmin learned in the Vedas. It is recommended, for example, that land free 
from taxes and fines should be granted to a Śrotriya, just as such lands are to be 
granted to the priests and preceptors of the ruler (2.1.7). It is also laid down that the 
property of a Śrotriya, even when he dies without an heir, cannot escheat to the state 
like the property of other citizens (3.5.28). Brahmins in general are, it seems, to be 
exempted from payment at ferries and pickets (3.20.14). In many cases, punishment 
for offences is made dependent on the varṇa of the offender. In cases of abuse, 
defamation, assault etc., an ascending scale of fines is prescribed in accordance with 
the offender's varṇa (Chapters 3.18 and 3.19). ... Discrimination on the basis of 
varṇa is referred to in connection with the oath to be administered to witnesses 
(3.11.34-37), in the matter of inheritance by sons born of wives belonging to 
different varṇas (3.6.17-20) and so on. Again, the varṇas are to occupy different 
residential areas in the city, the Brahmins in the north, the Kṣatriyas in the east and 
so on (2.4.9-15). It is also laid down that in social matters seniority shall be fixed 
from the Brahmin downwards. And the Brahmin is declared to be free to refuse 
contributions to common festivals and yet entitled to take full part in them (3.10.43-
44). There can be no doubt about th high status enjoyed by the Brahmin as such, or 
about the privileges and concessions reserved for him. 
 
It is more than likely that the Arthaśāstra paints a far too attractive picture of the privileges 
of the Brahmins, but this is no doubt due to the fact that Brahmins were involved in trying 
to influence public life at and around the royal court; they had to convince the king that it 
was his task to instal and maintain “the law laid down in the Vedic lore which is beneficial, 
as it prescribes the respective duties of the four varṇas and the four āśramas”.62 They may 
                         
61
 See e.g. Nāradaparivrājaka Upaniṣad ed. Dikshitar p. 81, ed. Schrader p. 159: ekarātraṃ vased 
grāme pattane tu dinatrayam / pure dinadvayaṃ bhikṣur nagare pañcarātrakam // “A mendicant 
may spend one night in a village, two in a burg, three in a town, and five in a city.” tr. Olivelle, 
1992: 187. 
62
 Arthaśāstra 1.3.4: eṣa trayīdharmaś caturṇāṃ varṇānām āśramāṇāṃ ca svadharmasthāpanād 
aupakārikaḥ. Tr. Kangle, 1972: 7, modified. 
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or may not have obtained all the privileges they wanted, but the for us important fact is that 
they were there, at the courts and in the cities. These were urban Brahmins, who should not 
be confused with those other Brahmins who stayed as far as possible from urban centres, in 
the countryside where they stuck to their Vedic traditions.
63
 
 In view of the above it seems justified to distinguish for this period two kinds of 
Brahmins who may have been rather different from each other: the rural ones and the urban 
ones. The rural ones could, more than the urban ones, continue their traditional life styles, 
and remain relatively aloof from developments in the urban world. The urban Brahmins, on 
the other hand, had to compete for the favours of the king, and stay au courant in various 
other ways.
64
 They might be cynical with regard to their Brahmanical status, but they could 
not give it up, because it was their main claim to privilege.
65
 
 A remark in the Arthaśāstra, a text characterised by straight talk, may illustrate this. 
It speaks about the Bārhaspatyas (different, it seems, from the Cārvākas who also came to 
be known by that name), and says the following about them:
66
 
 
‘The science of material welfare and the science of government and politics [are the 
only sciences],’ say the followers of Bṛhaspati. For the Vedic lore is only a cloak for 
one conversant with the ways of the world. 
 
It is clear from the context that the Bārhaspatyas do not accept “the science of the three 
Vedas” (trayī). But far from making an issue of this, they are of the opinion that “the Vedic 
lore is only a cloak for one conversant with the ways of the world” (saṃvaraṇamātraṃ hi 
                         
63
 It is in this context interesting to see that an insertion in the Harivaṃśa (327*, after 21.34, p. 148) 
speaks of an nāstivādārthaśāstra taught by Bṛhaspati in order to confuse Indra's enemies 
(Hillebrandt, 1916: 20 [348]). 
64
 Cp. Tucci, 1923-29: 67: “Il brahmano dunque, modello d'ogni perfezione ideale, tanto più veniva 
apprezzato, quanto più vasto il suo sapere: era ben naturale quindi che, cresciuta la sua importanza, 
vivendo all'ombra delle corti e dei potenti, destinato spesso ai più alti uffici, esso dovesse essere 
esperto anche nelle arti utili alla vita o nel governo dei popoli o in tutte quelle cognizioni 
scientifiche che potessero servire ad un pratico sfruttamento: purohita e mantrin erano ugualmente 
brahmani, che guidavano e consigliavano i principi nel disbrigo delle pubbliche cose ...” 
65
 Franco and Preisendanz (1998: 179) observe: “It is quite possible, though not yet provable, that 
Indian materialism developed in kingly and state administration circles as an alternative worldview 
counterbalancing that of the priestly class.” If our reflections are justified, the first part of Franco 
and Preisendanz's observation (“Indian materialism developed in kingly and state administration 
circles”) is correct, whereas the second part (“materialism ... as an alternative worldview 
counterbalancing that of the priestly class”) is not. 
66
 Arthaśāstra 1.2.4-5: vārttā daṇḍanītiś ceti bārhaspatyāḥ / saṃvaraṇamātraṃ hi trayī 
lokayātrāvida iti /. Tr. Kangle, 1972: 6, modified. 
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trayī lokayātrāvida[ḥ]).67 As far as I can see, this can mean only one thing. These 
Bārhaspatyas kept their convictions as to the real efficacy of the three Vedas to themselves, 
because they did not wish to lose the advantages which they derived from this knowledge. 
This implies, of course, that they were Brahmins, but cynical Brahmins. Not all Brahmins 
were Bārhaspatyas, to be sure, and not all were as cynical, we may presume. Yet this 
remark may give an impression of the attitude of at least some urban Brahmins. 
 These urban Brahmins had to face the brunt of the onslaught of the new ideas of 
rebirth and karmic retribution, for the kingly courts, and the cities, were natural focal points 
for different ideologies to confront each other. The life of these Brahmins may have left 
them little space for traditional rites, but they would not be able to ignore the confrontation 
with the new ideas about rebirth and karmic retribution. It is in the surroundings of the 
royal court, including the capital city, that we may have to look for Brahmins who took up 
the challenge and responded to it in a coordinated fashion. They, or some of them, fought 
back. They rejected the belief in rebirth, and the existence of “another world” in general. 
Sometimes they may have succeeded in convincing their king; in such cases their 
opponents might associate this for them heretical point of view with a king: Pāyāsi, Paesi, 
Vena, or someone else. 
In the long run they did not however succeed, at least not in this particular respect. 
As Brahmins they succeeded in gaining the social dominance which came to characterise 
future centuries almost throughout the subcontinent. The battle against the doctrine of 
rebirth and karmic retribution, on the other hand, they lost. Later centuries would depict the 
early defenders of the Vedic tradition against this onslaught as being themselves critics of 
the Vedic tradition. The Cārvākas would turn in their graves if they knew. 
 
 
                         
67
 This interpretation is no doubt to be preferred to the one proposed by Tucci (1923-29: 68, 80), 
according to which Vedic lore is merely an obstacle for those who know the ways of the world (“La 
teologia è soltanto un ostacolo per chi conosce l'andamento del mondo”). 
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